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Red-evidence: naalp-a2a-hook (A2A framework-hook adapter)

Mutation-survival evidence for naalp_a2a_hook/a2a_hook.py's property ("verifies INBOUND before delivery, rejects with a named reason on failure" -- fail CLOSED, never fail open). Produced by actually editing naalp_a2a_hook/a2a_hook.py (never naalp_kit/binding.py or impl/python/naalp/*, both out of scope and already separately graded), confirming the named tests flip RED for the stated reason, then restoring the file from a .bak copy (never git checkout -- this tree is uncommitted), clearing __pycache__ (PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 set for every run), and re-running the full 27-test suite GREEN.

Baseline / reverted file hash for naalp_a2a_hook/a2a_hook.py (SHA-256), confirmed identical before the mutation and after the revert:

43759b32387fdc38aae23bd9b14c85bb4ac7014cd7eddeb120b8e162f2237f3c

Run command (from the repo root, invoking the real installed Python interpreter for this platform -- on Windows the Microsoft-Store python/python3 execution-alias stubs resolve ahead of a real install on PATH and hang, so invoke the actual interpreter binary directly rather than the bare python command):

PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 python -m pytest ecosystem/naalp-a2a-hook/tests/test_a2a_hook.py -v

M1 -- inbound-gating-fails-closed-never-open (test_on_message_send_gating_denies_before_the_delegate_is_ever_called, test_on_message_send_stream_gating_denies_before_any_event_is_yielded)

Mutated: NaalpA2ARequestHandler._capture_inbound_message's gating branch -- the ONE place this requires a genuine authorization refusal to actually reach the caller as a raised policy.PolicyError, preventing the wrapped delegate's on_message_send/on_message_send_stream from ever running:

         verified = _capture_and_record(
             self._signer, self._recorder, session_key, payload, effect,
         )
         if self._gating:
-            binding.authorize_action(verified, self._grant)  # raises policy.PolicyError, unwrapped
+            pass  # MUTATION M1 (red-evidence, naalp-a2a-hook): swallow the authorization
+            # decision entirely -- the exact fail-OPEN defect this forbids (a gated inbound
+            # message would be delivered to the local agent regardless of its declared effect).

RED, confirmed:

FAILED ecosystem/naalp-a2a-hook/tests/test_a2a_hook.py::test_on_message_send_gating_denies_before_the_delegate_is_ever_called
    Failed: DID NOT RAISE PolicyError

FAILED ecosystem/naalp-a2a-hook/tests/test_a2a_hook.py::test_on_message_send_stream_gating_denies_before_any_event_is_yielded
    Failed: DID NOT RAISE PolicyError

2 failed, 25 passed in 2.69s

Both failures are the assertion (pytest.raises(policy.PolicyError) never firing), not an import/collection error -- confirming the tests genuinely exercise the fail-closed property and would not pass against a fail-open implementation. test_on_message_send_gating_denies_... additionally asserts delegate.calls == [] after the raise -- with the mutation live, the with pytest.raises(...) block itself fails before that assertion is reached (the call DOES go through with the mutation, which is precisely the defect), so the raised-Failed above is the first and correct symptom.

Reverted, confirmed byte-identical (SHA-256 matches the baseline above), full suite GREEN:

27 passed in 2.45s

Non-circularity

Every RED/GREEN run above verifies the recorded signed object independently through naalp.ez.verify(signer.public_key, signed_bytes) -- the same real, already-graded Part-1 core -- never through naalp_a2a_hook's own bookkeeping. binding._extract_payload is reused from a DIFFERENT, separately-graded sibling module purely to compare the recovered opaque payload bytes; none of this module's own new code (payload construction from canonical_proto_bytes, session-key/context-id derivation, the gating decision, the RequestHandler delegation) is used to validate itself.