Channel: Identity (0x0003)¶
The durable identity layer: rotation, revocation, and foreign-identity linkage. The signer-id construction and its verification are part of the spine (the draft's Identity section); this surface is the workflow around it (the draft's Channel Surfaces section).
Baseline kinds¶
| Code | Kind | Effect | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Rotation |
non_idempotent_write |
co-signed old+new key |
| 1 | Revocation |
destructive |
|
| 2 | ForeignLink |
idempotent_write |
binds a foreign identity to an N-AALP signer id (§ below) |
| 3 | KeyAnnounce |
read_only |
publish an RFC 7250 SPKI for a signer id |
This is the current registry impl/go/channels/channels.go carries verbatim
(Table entry for Identity),
cross-checked against an independent per-channel oracle.
Self-certifying signer ids, no CA¶
N-AALP's identity model is "no CA," self-certifying, offline-verifiable: a signer id is a hash of the multicodec-tagged public key, never a value a third party issues.
// impl/go/identity/identity.go
// signer = multibase(base32, multihash(0x12, SHA-256(multicodec(mc, pubkey))))
// where mc is the multiformats multicodec key-type code (ed25519-pub 0xed, mldsa-65-pub ...)
func SignerID(alg int, pubkey []byte) (string, error)
(identity.go:75).
Because a signer id is a one-way hash, it cannot be inverted back into a public key by itself —
every verify path recomputes the hash from a presented key (CheckSigner) rather than trusting the
id as a lookup key.
State model¶
An identity thread is a causes-linked chain of Rotations ending at most in one Revocation.
RotationUnauthorized, KeyRevoked, and SignerMismatch are the baseline channel's named errors.
Rotation and revocation, co-signed¶
SignRotation requires both the old and the new signing key to co-sign the rotation record — a
compromised new key alone cannot rotate an identity, and a stolen old key alone cannot either:
func SignRotation(r RotationRecord, oldSigner, newSigner cose.Signer) (oldSig, newSig []byte, err error)
func VerifyRotation(r RotationRecord, oldV, newV cose.Verifier, oldPub, newPub, oldSig, newSig []byte) error
(identity.go:155,
identity.go:171).
VerifyRevocation additionally accepts a recovery-key quorum (recoveryIDs) so a lost signing key
does not permanently strand an identity's revocation path.
Portable identity: ForeignLink and the did:jwk bridge¶
ForeignLink is the linkage primitive the ecosystem's DID/VC bridge (ecosystem/naalp-did, Go)
builds on — a cross-signed record {controls, foreign_id, not_after} binding a foreign identity
(for example, a W3C DID) to an N-AALP signer id, signed by the foreign identity's own key:
type ForeignLinkRecord struct {
Controls string // the N-AALP signer id this record binds
ForeignID string // the foreign identity string (e.g. a did:jwk URI)
NotAfter uint64 // the link's validity horizon
}
func VerifyForeignLink(r ForeignLinkRecord, foreignV cose.Verifier, foreignPub, sig []byte, now uint64) (linked bool, err error)
(identity.go:233,
identity.go:252).
VerifyForeignLink requires ForeignID to be Unicode NFC (RequireNFC), rejects an expired link
(NotAfter in the past), and rejects a link whose signature does not verify under the foreign
identity's own claimed key — a link is only real when the foreign identity itself signed it, never
when the N-AALP side merely asserts the binding. The ecosystem/naalp-did package (Go) is the
concrete production caller: it bridges an N-AALP signer id to a did:jwk URI carrying an
RFC 9964 kty:"AKP" JWK for the agent's actual
ML-DSA-65/87 (or an RFC 8037 OKP JWK for Ed25519) public key, and calls LinkSignerToDID to build
and sign the ForeignLinkRecord this mechanism already defines — no new linkage primitive, only a
deterministic encoder for the DID string.
Failure modes¶
| Error kind | When |
|---|---|
RotationUnauthorized |
a rotation record is missing the required old-or-new co-signature |
KeyRevoked |
a signature verifies under a key whose revocation record predates it |
SignerMismatch |
the presented key does not hash to the claimed signer id |
Every check is fail-closed (the draft's Security Considerations section): a failing action is rejected whole, returns its named error, and causes no state change.
See also: the twenty channels, effects and safety,
the discovery reference for the Discovery-channel and signed-description
mechanisms ForeignLink composes with at the identity layer.