Channel: Capability (0x0002)¶
Capability tokens: issuance, delegation, revocation, and lookup. Like every channel surface, Capability adds only kind codes and their declared effects over the one object model — no channel-local encoding, signature, or identity (the draft's Channel Surfaces section).
Baseline kinds¶
| Code | Kind | Effect | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | CapIssue |
non_idempotent_write |
issue a new capability token |
| 1 | CapDelegate |
non_idempotent_write |
delegate a capability, forming a causes chain to its parent |
| 2 | CapRevoke |
destructive |
revoke a capability |
| 3 | CapLookup |
read_only |
look up a capability's status |
This is the baseline registry impl/go/channels/channels.go carries verbatim
(Table entry for Capability),
cross-checked against an independent per-channel oracle so Go, Rust, and the oracle agree on
every kind code and effect.
State model¶
A capability is issued → (delegated…)* → (revoked | expired). Delegation forms a causes
chain (the draft's Audit, Causal Graph, and Ordering section) so a delegated capability names its parent by content id — the parent
relationship is not a separate field, it is the object graph itself.
The attenuation rule: CapExceedsParent¶
The one channel-specific structural check Capability defines is that a delegation may not
grant more than its parent. CheckDelegation in the shared registry enforces the effect
ceiling:
// impl/go/channels/channels.go
func CheckDelegation(parentMax, childMax policy.Effect) error {
if !parentMax.Authorizes(childMax) { // childMax <= parentMax
return ErrCapExceedsParent
}
return nil
}
(CheckDelegation, channels.go:184-189),
tested directly by
TestCapExceedsParent:
a delegation asking for a Destructive ceiling under a NonIdempotentWrite parent is rejected
CapExceedsParent; a delegation asking for a ceiling at or below the parent's succeeds. This is
the same lattice-attenuation rule from the draft's Effects and Authorization section, and it is the one rule every
higher-privilege escalation in the protocol — including the tier-1 multi-hop delegation below —
reuses rather than re-deriving.
Tier 1+: multi-hop agent delegation¶
Capability's baseline (CapIssue / CapDelegate) answers what a token may do in a single
hop. A tier-1 escalation, DelegationGrant (the draft's Channel Surfaces section), answers a related but
distinct question: who may act on whose behalf, across multiple hops, terminating at a
trust anchor. It is deliberately built as an escalation of the same substrate rather than a
parallel mechanism — the delegation parent is still named by content id in causes (the draft's Audit, Causal Graph, and Ordering section), and it reuses the identical CapExceedsParent attenuation rule:
// impl/go/delegation/delegation.go
const (
ChannelCapability uint64 = 0x0002 // reuses the CapDelegate substrate
KindDelegationGrant uint64 = 4 // the next free code after CapIssue/CapDelegate/CapRevoke/CapLookup
Tier uint64 = 1 // a named escalation, not a deferral
)
(delegation.go:41-50).
A Grant carries the delegatee (Subject), the effect ceiling it confers (EffectCap), the
maximum further onward-delegation depth (MaxDepth), an optional resource Scope, and a
validity window — the issuer is never a body field, it is the verified envelope signer
(the draft's Channel Surfaces section). Chain verification is a 12-step leaf-to-root walk, graded so that Go and
Rust reproduce the independent oracle's verdict for every scenario over real ML-DSA-65 signed
chains — including expired grants, revoked grants, untrusted chain roots, and a chain whose
realized depth exceeds MaxDepth.
Failure modes¶
| Error kind | When |
|---|---|
CapExceedsParent |
a delegation (baseline or tier-1) asks for more than its parent grants |
CapRevoked |
the capability named has been revoked |
ChainBroken |
(tier-1) a delegation-chain link is missing, ambiguous, or unverifiable |
GrantExpired / GrantNotYetValid / GrantRevoked |
(tier-1) the grant is outside its validity window, or revoked |
UntrustedChainRoot |
(tier-1) the chain's root issuer is not in the trust-anchor set |
DelegationDepthExceeded |
(tier-1) the declared or realized depth exceeds MaxDepth |
NonNFC |
(tier-1) Subject or Scope is not Unicode NFC |
GrantMalformed |
(tier-1) the grant body is not the expected shape or has an out-of-range field |
Every check is fail-closed (the draft's Security Considerations section): a failing action is rejected whole, returns its named error, and causes no state change. There is no partial credit and no fail-open path.
See also: the twenty channels, effects and safety.