Channel: Audit (0x000B)¶
The receipt chain and the auditor. The mechanism — the signed hash-chained receipt, the offline-checkable causal graph, and the equivocation auditor — lives in the spine (the draft's Audit, Causal Graph, and Ordering section); this surface is the access to it (the draft's Channel Surfaces section).
Baseline kinds¶
| Code | Kind | Effect | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Receipt |
non_idempotent_write |
one signed append to an ordering authority's chain |
| 1 | AuditQuery |
read_only |
|
| 2 | ForkProof |
read_only |
a signed proof of equivocation an auditor emits |
| 3 | CheckpointRoot |
non_idempotent_write |
a log operator's signed Merkle tree head (§ below) |
| 4 | WitnessCosign |
non_idempotent_write |
an independent countersignature over one checkpoint (§ below) |
| 5 | InclusionProof |
read_only |
proves one record was a leaf under a named checkpoint (§ below) |
This is the current registry impl/go/channels/channels.go carries verbatim
(Table entry for Audit),
cross-checked against an independent per-channel oracle.
The receipt chain¶
An ordering authority records each accepted object by appending a signed Receipt {prev, obj, seq,
at}: the chain is tamper-evident because reordering, omission, or substitution breaks a prev
link or a seq. The authority never mutates the origin object to order it — ordering is an outer
signed layer, and the object's own signature stays valid:
// impl/go/audit/audit.go
type Receipt struct {
Prev []byte // hash of the previous receipt body (48 bytes SHA-384; genesis is zero)
Obj []byte // content id of the accepted object (never the object itself)
Seq uint64 // monotonic sequence position within this authority's chain
At uint64 // the authority's time anchor, epoch ms (independent of the signer's clock)
}
(audit.go:41-46).
The causal graph is the authority-independent foundation underneath the chain: an edge "A causes
B" is proven by B's signature over A's content id and is checkable offline; a cause an effect could
not have seen — a later position, or a cycle — is rejected CausalViolation. An auditor detects
equivocation, two receipts by one authority at one seq naming different objects, from the signed
receipts alone.
Merkle-batched checkpoints: CheckpointRoot, WitnessCosign, InclusionProof¶
Tree construction follows RFC 9162 §2.1 exactly,
SHA-384-profiled: leaf hash = HASH(0x00 || leaf); interior node hash =
HASH(0x01 || left || right); the inclusion-path recursion generates a leaf-to-root audit path,
and the inverse recursion recomputes the root from (leaf, index, size, path) and compares against
the named root, rejecting InclusionProofInvalid on any mismatch, fail-closed
(gateway/checkpoint.go
— Audit's Merkle-batching kinds are implemented in the gateway package alongside GatewayDecision,
since both are governed-decision evidence primitives that share the same signed-bytes-are-authority
property).
CheckpointRoot— a log operator's signed Merkle tree head over a leaf set of record content ids, chaining byprevexactly as the baseline receipt chain does.WitnessCosign— the wire hook for an independent countersignature over one exact checkpoint by content id. Two witness-cosigned roots at one(log, size)carrying different root values are fork evidence — the log has signed two incompatible histories.InclusionProof— proves one record's content id was a leaf under a named checkpoint, verifiable without trusting the log operator further than the checkpoint's own signature.
This closes the gap the design's baseline text left as a named tier-1 escalation ("Merkle-batched signed roots for cheap inclusion proofs at scale") — the current implementation registers it as a baseline kind rather than deferring it.
Failure modes¶
| Error kind | When |
|---|---|
ChainBroken |
a receipt's prev/seq does not chain to the previous receipt |
Equivocation |
two receipts at one seq name different objects |
ReceiptUnsigned |
a receipt's signature does not verify |
CausalViolation |
the causal graph has a cycle or a future cause |
ForkProofInvalid |
a fork proof does not actually prove equivocation |
CheckpointMalformed |
a checkpoint-root or witness-cosign body is not well-formed |
InclusionProofInvalid |
a recomputed Merkle root does not match the named checkpoint root |
Every check is fail-closed (the draft's Security Considerations section): a failing object is rejected whole, returns its named error, and causes no state change — no ledger append, no checkpoint update.
See also: the twenty channels, effects and safety,
the Governance channel for the DecisionRecord that binds to a witnessed
checkpoint root, and the Federation channel for the higher-tier reconcile that
merges multiple authorities' chains over this same causal graph.