N-PAMP-01 — Cryptographic Suites (reference)¶
Derived extract. Authoritative source:
../ietf/draft-bubblefish-npamp-latest.md(revision draft-bubblefish-npamp-01; integrity pinned in ../PIN.json), §7 "Cryptographic Suites". The draft governs. Machine-readable:../registries/{kem,aead,signatures}.csv.All primitives are published standards.
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM)¶
| Code point | Name | Profiles |
|---|---|---|
| 0x11ec | X25519MLKEM768 | Standard, High |
| 0x11ed | SecP384r1MLKEM1024 | High, Sovereign |
Both are hybrid KEMs combining an elliptic-curve ECDH with ML-KEM (FIPS 203), per
RFC 10024 (formerly draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem, published August 2026).
The concatenation order is per-group — for each
group it places the FIPS-approved component first as its defining construction
requires (NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2), so the two groups differ:
- X25519MLKEM768 (
0x11ec) combines X25519 with ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-first: shared secret(ML-KEM-768 SS || X25519 SS); KEMShareML-KEM-768 ek (1184) || X25519 pub (32)= 1216; KEMCiphertextML-KEM-768 ct (1088) || server X25519 pub (32)= 1120. The suite name lists X25519 first, but the bytes are ML-KEM-first (RFC 10024 records this reversed order as historical). - SecP384r1MLKEM1024 (
0x11ed) combines secp384r1 (P-384) with ML-KEM-1024, ECDHE-first (P-384 first): shared secret(ECDHE SS (48) || ML-KEM-1024 SS (32))= 80; KEMSharesecp384r1 pub (97) || ML-KEM-1024 ek (1568)= 1665; KEMCiphertextserver secp384r1 pub (97) || ML-KEM-1024 ct (1568)= 1665.
Both feed the concatenation raw to HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869) as input keying material (no hybrid-layer KDF). The Sovereign profile MUST NOT accept X25519MLKEM768.
Authenticated Encryption (AEAD)¶
| Code point | Name | Key | Nonce | Tag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0x0001 | AES-256-GCM | 32 | 12 | 16 |
| 0x0002 | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | 32 | 12 | 16 |
AES-256-GCM per RFC 5116; ChaCha20-Poly1305 per RFC 8439. AES-256-GCM (0x0001)
is Mandatory-To-Implement in every profile, so two conformant endpoints always
share at least one AEAD — a non-empty MUST-support intersection for every
profile × algorithm class (the Danvers Doctrine, BCP 61). Standard endpoints MUST
support AES-256-GCM and MAY additionally support ChaCha20-Poly1305. High and
Sovereign endpoints MUST support both (per-frame AEAD diversification selects
between them).
Per-frame AEAD selection¶
At High and Sovereign, per-frame AEAD diversification selects the AEAD suite for
each frame deterministically from the sequence number, with no per-frame wire
flag: the suite is AEADSelect[seq mod N], where AEADSelect is the negotiated
ordered list of selectable suites (primary first) and N is its length. Both peers
derive the same suite from the shared per-(channel, direction) sequence number, so
no per-frame suite indicator is carried on the wire. At Standard, diversification is
off: AEADSelect names a single suite and every frame uses it.
Consequently AEADSelect (TLV 0x0D) carries every suite the selection can index
— a variable-length list of 2-octet AEAD code points, primary first (one code
point at Standard; both suites at High and Sovereign). The former fixed 2-octet
encoding cannot stand while two suites must be selectable. The selector output is
frozen by a known-answer test (impl/go/aead_select_test.go): for the list
[AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305], frames 0, 1, 2, … use AES, ChaCha, AES, ….
Signatures¶
| Code point | Name | Usage | Profiles |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x0807 | Ed25519 | Identity, capability tokens | All |
| 0x0904 | ML-DSA-44 | Reserved (IANA TLS SignatureScheme); unused | — |
| 0x0905 | ML-DSA-65 | Reserved (IANA TLS SignatureScheme); unused | — |
| 0x0906 | ML-DSA-87 | Identity, audit epoch | High, Sovereign |
The ML-DSA code points reference the IANA TLS SignatureScheme registry
(draft-ietf-tls-mldsa): 0x0904 = ML-DSA-44, 0x0905 = ML-DSA-65, 0x0906 = ML-DSA-87.
N-PAMP negotiates only ML-DSA-87 (0x0906) at High and Sovereign; 0x0904/0x0905 are
listed so N-PAMP's namespace does not shadow the IANA values. Ed25519 per RFC 8032;
ML-DSA-87 per FIPS 204.
Registry authority. For every code point it shares with the IANA TLS registries —
the Supported-Groups KEM values (0x11ec, 0x11ed) and the SignatureScheme values
(0x0807, 0x0904–0x0906) — N-PAMP references the IANA value with its exact
semantics; it defines no code point that shadows an occupied IANA assignment.
The hybrid-KEM construction authority is RFC 10024 (formerly the Internet-Draft
draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem, published August 2026) — cited directly as a published
RFC. The ML-DSA code points draft-ietf-tls-mldsa remain an active Internet-Draft;
update that citation to its assigned RFC number on publication.
Key Derivation and Hashing¶
All key derivation uses HKDF (RFC 5869). KDF hash is SHA-256 at Standard and
SHA-384 at High and Sovereign. HKDF-Expand-Label follows TLS 1.3 (RFC 9846)
but with a protocol-specific label prefix that provides domain separation from
TLS 1.3, from QUIC, and from earlier N-PAMP versions. (A literal "tls13 " prefix
does NOT satisfy this and is non-conformant.)
Key Schedule and Nonces¶
Traffic secrets are derived per (direction, epoch, AEAD suite, channel) tuple, so no two distinct contexts share a key. Each traffic secret yields an AEAD key and an AEAD IV via HKDF-Expand-Label. (Header protection is provided by the secure transport; N-PAMP derives no separate header-protection key.)
The per-frame nonce is the AEAD IV exclusive-ORed with the left-zero-padded sequence number, identical in form to TLS 1.3 (RFC 9846) and QUIC (RFC 9001). (The Channel ID is NOT part of the nonce; a Channel-ID-in-nonce construction is non-conformant.) This namespace partitioning prevents cross-direction, cross-suite, and cross-channel nonce reuse and supports forward secrecy: on key update, new-epoch secrets are derived afresh and the prior epoch's secrets are zeroized.
Within a single (direction, epoch, AEAD suite, channel) key, sequence-number assignment MUST be atomic and single-writer: each frame MUST be sealed under exactly the sequence number it was assigned, so a multi-threaded sender cannot reuse a sequence number (and therefore a nonce) under one key. An endpoint MUST perform a key update before the negotiated AEAD's usage limit is reached and MUST NOT let the sequence space wrap within an epoch. Cross-(direction, epoch, suite, channel) reuse is structurally prevented by the key separation above; this rule covers the remaining intra-key case.
Random Number Generation¶
All security-participating randomness MUST come from a cryptographically secure RNG. Implementations MUST NOT use a non-cryptographic source for any security field.