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N-PAMP-01 — Cryptographic Suites (reference)

Derived extract. Authoritative source: ../ietf/draft-bubblefish-npamp-latest.md (revision draft-bubblefish-npamp-01; integrity pinned in ../PIN.json), §7 "Cryptographic Suites". The draft governs. Machine-readable: ../registries/{kem,aead,signatures}.csv.

All primitives are published standards.

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM)

Code point Name Profiles
0x11ec X25519MLKEM768 Standard, High
0x11ed SecP384r1MLKEM1024 High, Sovereign

Both are hybrid KEMs combining an elliptic-curve ECDH with ML-KEM (FIPS 203), per RFC 10024 (formerly draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem, published August 2026). The concatenation order is per-group — for each group it places the FIPS-approved component first as its defining construction requires (NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2), so the two groups differ:

  • X25519MLKEM768 (0x11ec) combines X25519 with ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-first: shared secret (ML-KEM-768 SS || X25519 SS); KEMShare ML-KEM-768 ek (1184) || X25519 pub (32) = 1216; KEMCiphertext ML-KEM-768 ct (1088) || server X25519 pub (32) = 1120. The suite name lists X25519 first, but the bytes are ML-KEM-first (RFC 10024 records this reversed order as historical).
  • SecP384r1MLKEM1024 (0x11ed) combines secp384r1 (P-384) with ML-KEM-1024, ECDHE-first (P-384 first): shared secret (ECDHE SS (48) || ML-KEM-1024 SS (32)) = 80; KEMShare secp384r1 pub (97) || ML-KEM-1024 ek (1568) = 1665; KEMCiphertext server secp384r1 pub (97) || ML-KEM-1024 ct (1568) = 1665.

Both feed the concatenation raw to HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869) as input keying material (no hybrid-layer KDF). The Sovereign profile MUST NOT accept X25519MLKEM768.

Authenticated Encryption (AEAD)

Code point Name Key Nonce Tag
0x0001 AES-256-GCM 32 12 16
0x0002 ChaCha20-Poly1305 32 12 16

AES-256-GCM per RFC 5116; ChaCha20-Poly1305 per RFC 8439. AES-256-GCM (0x0001) is Mandatory-To-Implement in every profile, so two conformant endpoints always share at least one AEAD — a non-empty MUST-support intersection for every profile × algorithm class (the Danvers Doctrine, BCP 61). Standard endpoints MUST support AES-256-GCM and MAY additionally support ChaCha20-Poly1305. High and Sovereign endpoints MUST support both (per-frame AEAD diversification selects between them).

Per-frame AEAD selection

At High and Sovereign, per-frame AEAD diversification selects the AEAD suite for each frame deterministically from the sequence number, with no per-frame wire flag: the suite is AEADSelect[seq mod N], where AEADSelect is the negotiated ordered list of selectable suites (primary first) and N is its length. Both peers derive the same suite from the shared per-(channel, direction) sequence number, so no per-frame suite indicator is carried on the wire. At Standard, diversification is off: AEADSelect names a single suite and every frame uses it.

Consequently AEADSelect (TLV 0x0D) carries every suite the selection can index — a variable-length list of 2-octet AEAD code points, primary first (one code point at Standard; both suites at High and Sovereign). The former fixed 2-octet encoding cannot stand while two suites must be selectable. The selector output is frozen by a known-answer test (impl/go/aead_select_test.go): for the list [AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305], frames 0, 1, 2, … use AES, ChaCha, AES, ….

Signatures

Code point Name Usage Profiles
0x0807 Ed25519 Identity, capability tokens All
0x0904 ML-DSA-44 Reserved (IANA TLS SignatureScheme); unused —
0x0905 ML-DSA-65 Reserved (IANA TLS SignatureScheme); unused —
0x0906 ML-DSA-87 Identity, audit epoch High, Sovereign

The ML-DSA code points reference the IANA TLS SignatureScheme registry (draft-ietf-tls-mldsa): 0x0904 = ML-DSA-44, 0x0905 = ML-DSA-65, 0x0906 = ML-DSA-87. N-PAMP negotiates only ML-DSA-87 (0x0906) at High and Sovereign; 0x0904/0x0905 are listed so N-PAMP's namespace does not shadow the IANA values. Ed25519 per RFC 8032; ML-DSA-87 per FIPS 204.

Registry authority. For every code point it shares with the IANA TLS registries — the Supported-Groups KEM values (0x11ec, 0x11ed) and the SignatureScheme values (0x0807, 0x0904–0x0906) — N-PAMP references the IANA value with its exact semantics; it defines no code point that shadows an occupied IANA assignment.

The hybrid-KEM construction authority is RFC 10024 (formerly the Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem, published August 2026) — cited directly as a published RFC. The ML-DSA code points draft-ietf-tls-mldsa remain an active Internet-Draft; update that citation to its assigned RFC number on publication.

Key Derivation and Hashing

All key derivation uses HKDF (RFC 5869). KDF hash is SHA-256 at Standard and SHA-384 at High and Sovereign. HKDF-Expand-Label follows TLS 1.3 (RFC 9846) but with a protocol-specific label prefix that provides domain separation from TLS 1.3, from QUIC, and from earlier N-PAMP versions. (A literal "tls13 " prefix does NOT satisfy this and is non-conformant.)

Key Schedule and Nonces

Traffic secrets are derived per (direction, epoch, AEAD suite, channel) tuple, so no two distinct contexts share a key. Each traffic secret yields an AEAD key and an AEAD IV via HKDF-Expand-Label. (Header protection is provided by the secure transport; N-PAMP derives no separate header-protection key.)

The per-frame nonce is the AEAD IV exclusive-ORed with the left-zero-padded sequence number, identical in form to TLS 1.3 (RFC 9846) and QUIC (RFC 9001). (The Channel ID is NOT part of the nonce; a Channel-ID-in-nonce construction is non-conformant.) This namespace partitioning prevents cross-direction, cross-suite, and cross-channel nonce reuse and supports forward secrecy: on key update, new-epoch secrets are derived afresh and the prior epoch's secrets are zeroized.

Within a single (direction, epoch, AEAD suite, channel) key, sequence-number assignment MUST be atomic and single-writer: each frame MUST be sealed under exactly the sequence number it was assigned, so a multi-threaded sender cannot reuse a sequence number (and therefore a nonce) under one key. An endpoint MUST perform a key update before the negotiated AEAD's usage limit is reached and MUST NOT let the sequence space wrap within an epoch. Cross-(direction, epoch, suite, channel) reuse is structurally prevented by the key separation above; this rule covers the remaining intra-key case.

Random Number Generation

All security-participating randomness MUST come from a cryptographically secure RNG. Implementations MUST NOT use a non-cryptographic source for any security field.